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A New Imperialism? Evaluating Russia’s Acquisition
of Crimea in the Context of National and
International Law
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2013, after some progress toward greater
economic union between Ukraine and the European Union, thencurrent President Yanukovych suspended Ukraine’s preparations for
a trade deal with the European Union, instead choosing closer ties
with Russia. 1 During the following three months, a variety of
protests took place with some physical confrontations also
occurring. 2 On February 18, 2014, the confrontations between
protestors and police officers reached their bloodiest day yet, leading
to the deaths of at least eighteen people, with casualties on both
sides. 3 In the aftermath of the violence, President Yanukovych fled
from the country and was replaced by an interim leader, Oleksandr
Turchynov, who acted as president until elections were held in May. 4
Hours after Yanukovych fled, he was impeached by Ukraine’s
parliament for abusing his powers. 5 Russia sent forces to the Crimea
region of Ukraine, despite repeated claims by Putin that there were
“no Russian units in eastern Ukraine . . . . All this is being done by
the local residents.”6 According to Putin, the presence of soldiers in
Ukraine had been required so that the Crimeans could choose in a

1. Marta Shokalo, Ukraine Crisis: Police Storm Main Kiev ‘Maidan’ Protest Camp,
BBC (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26249330.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO
LIBERTY (Feb.
23, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ousterconstitutional/25274346.html.
5. Ukraine President Yanukovich Impeached, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:12 PM
GMT),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/02/ukraine-parliament-oustspresident-yanukovich-2014222152035601620.html.
6. Kathy Lally, Putin’s Remarks Raise Fears of Future Moves Against Ukraine, WASH.
POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-courseadmits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7abe01a9b69cf1_story.html.
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referendum whether to remain with Ukraine or join Russia. 7
However, there are reports that President Putin had authorized the
invasion of Ukraine even before the government collapsed. 8 Prior to
the referendum, Russia significantly increased its military presence in
Crimea by increasing the number of troops on the peninsula to
around twenty-two thousand. 9 The results of the referendum were
incredibly in favor of joining Russia, with over ninety-five percent of
the voters choosing reunification. 10 Crimean election officials
declared that participation in the vote exceeded eightythree percent. 11
Western governments and the interim Ukrainian prime minister
Yatsenyuk rejected the referendum, with the prime minister declaring
the vote a “circus” with Moscow as the “stage direct[or].” 12 Indeed,
Russia’s significant military presence was cited as one of the reasons
that the United States and Western nations would not recognize the
results of the referendum as legitimate. 13 Though the United States
acknowledged that it expected the ethnic Russian population to vote
in favor of joining Russia, it took issue with the process that had
been used: the United States claimed the process violated the
Ukrainian Constitution, “occurred under duress of Russian military
intervention,” and was “administered under threats of violence and
intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates

7. Id.
8. Matthew Schofield, Russian News Report: Putin Approved Ukraine Invasion Before
Kiev Government Collapsed, MCCLATCHYDC (Feb. 21, 2015, 6:08 AM),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/02/21/257386/russian-news-report-ukraine-invasion.
html. Novaya Gazeta, a relatively independent investigative newspaper in Russia, supposedly
gained access to documents detailing the strategy for invading Ukraine planned weeks before
the government collapsed. Id.
9. Carol Morello, Will Englund & Griff Witte, Crimea’s Parliament Votes to Join
Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/crimeasparliament-votes-to-join-russia/2014/03/17/5c3b96ca-adba-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_
story.html.
10. Carol Morello, Pamela Constable & Anthony Faiola, Crimeans Vote to Break Away
from Ukraine, Join Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2014/03/16/ccec2132-acd4-11e3-a06a-e3230a43d6cb_story.html.
11. Morello, Englund & Witte, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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international law.” 14 In addition, Yatsenyuk claimed the actual vote
allowed individuals with foreign passports to vote, lacked proper
monitoring, and was occurring in the presence of armed men. 15
CNN photographers captured at least one instance of a voter
dropping two papers into the ballot box. 16
President Putin recognized Crimea’s independence the day
following the referendum, despite the significant sanctions that had
been imposed on Russia by the West. 17 The Supreme Rada of
Crimea, the region’s parliament, held a session declaring
independence, although “[m]asked men in body armor” blocked
journalists’ access to the meeting. 18 The Crimean Supreme Rada
nationalized Ukrainian state property and requested recognition
from the United Nations. 19 On March 21, the Russian parliament
approved the annexation of Crimea, 20 and President Putin signed the
bill completing the annexation shortly thereafter. 21 The United
Nations, unable to pass a Security Council resolution 22 due to
Russia’s veto power, 23 resorted to a General Assembly resolution
14. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Ukraine
(Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/16/statementpress-secretary-ukraine; Laura Smith-Spark, Diana Magnay & Nick Paton Walsh, Ukraine
Crisis: Early Results Show Crimea Votes to Join Russia, CNN (Mar. 16, 2014, 7:52 PM ET),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/.
15. Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Jim Heintz, Crimea Parliament Declares Independence from Ukraine After
Referendum, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
03/17/crimea-parliament-declares-independence_n_4977584.html. Recognition of Crimea
occurred “just hours after the United States and the European Union announced asset freezes
and other sanctions against Russian and Ukrainian officials involved” in Crimea. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Russia Officially Annexes Crimea away from Ukraine with Signature from Vladimir
Putin, CBSNEWS (Mar. 21, 2014, 8:13 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russiaannexes-crimea-away-from-ukraine-with-signature-from-vladimir-putin/.
21. Timothy Heritage & Darya Korsunskaya, Russia Rules out Handing back Crimea,
Expands War Games, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015, 1:29 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-russia-idUSKBN0MD0Z220150317.
22. S.C. Draft Res. S/2014/189, U.N. Doc. S/2014/189 (Mar. 15, 2014). The draft
resolution specifically reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial borders and declared that
the referendum was not valid and should not be recognized by any nation. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5.
23. U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7138th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV/7138 (Mar. 15,
2014). The final vote was thirteen votes to one with one abstention but because Russia is a
permanent member of the council, the resolution was not adopted. Id.
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calling upon states not to recognize a change in Crimea’s status after
the referendum. 24
The actions of Russia in Crimea, including its military presence
on the peninsula and its encouragement of the referendum, violated
Ukrainian domestic law, Russia’s international obligations under the
U.N. Charter, and Russia’s obligations under treaties with Ukraine.
Furthermore, the process did not conform to the requirements of
Russia’s own Federal Constitutional Law on the Acceptance of New
Territories into the Russian Federation. Kosovo is an example of
recent precedent for unilateral declarations of independence.
However, the situation in Ukraine was not analogous to Kosovo and
does not support the legality of the referendum held in Crimea,
contrary to the claims made by President Putin and the
Russian government.
Part II of this paper will examine the historical means that have
been recognized by nations as methods of acquiring new territory.
Part III will examine the rights and abilities of parts of nations to
unilaterally declare their independence and examine whether the
process used in Crimea and Sevastopol conformed to both Ukrainian
domestic law and international law. Part IV will discuss whether
Russia’s acquisition of Crimea complies with its international legal
obligations, both as a member of the United Nations and with
regards to its treaties. Part V will consider Russian domestic law to
determine if the process used by Russia complied with its own
domestic legal requirements. Part VI will conclude.
II. INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT ON TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION
International law recognizes several different methods of
acquiring title to territory. While some of the methods are no longer
very applicable to modern claims for territory, there remain many
controversies regarding who the sovereign controller is over islands,
land subject to border disputes, and the arctic and Antarctic
regions. 25 Disputes over ownership of territory have frequently led to
armed conflict in the past, while settlement of these disagreements

24. G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶ 6 (Mar. 27, 2014). The resolution was passed with 100 votes
to 11 with 58 abstentions. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc.
A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014).
25. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (5th ed. 2009).
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based on international law can lead to peaceful negotiations and
solutions. 26 Indeed, international proceedings, in both courts and
arbitration, frequently resolve disputes concerning boundaries and
title to land and islands. 27 The main methods of acquiring territory
differ depending on the source cited—for the purposes of this
discussion, occupation, accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription
will be described below. 28
A. Occupation
Occupation refers to the act of acquiring territory that is not
under the sovereignty of another state—it is one of the original
modes of acquisition because title is not derived from another state. 29
During the colonization of North America, the European naval
powers relied on the Roman concept of terra nullius (nobody’s land)
to claim vast swathes of land on the new continent. 30 In general,
occupation requires both that the territory be terra nullius and that
the appropriation of territory be real or effective. 31 Real or effective
possession generally requires an “announced intention to acquire[]
and actual settlement or occupation with the assertion of
governmental authority.” 32 Thus, the act must be a state act or an act
26. Id. at 376–77.
27. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215
(8th ed. 2012); see also Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of
Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779 (2004) (detailing a variety of cases that the International Court of
Justice has heard on territorial and boundary disputes and various theories the Court has
applied in its decision-making).
28. Compare CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 240 (accretion), with DAMROSCH ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 382 (succession). A state can also establish title to territory by demonstrating
that it is a successor to the prior state that held title to the territory but that has dissolved or
disappeared or from which the state seceded. Id. While other issues related to succession are
more complex, such as assumption of debts and assets and other international obligations, it is
important to note that succession does not alter the borders that existed between the nowdefunct state and neighboring countries—the title of all of the succeeding states cannot exceed
the title that the defunct state held. Id. at 382–83. Brownlie also acknowledges judicial
adjudication as a possible mode of acquisition, although it would likely also fit under the
cession umbrella. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 229.
29. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 686 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
30. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 377.
31. NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELATIONS 146 (1945).
32. Id. at 147.
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acknowledged by a state—the acts of individuals do not confer
territory to a state. 33 The European powers did not require that the
land not be inhabited, instead terra nullius referred to territory that
was yet unclaimed by European states. 34 In modern times, the vast
majority of the planet, particularly the areas in which humans can
live, has fallen under the sovereignty of a nation, so it is unlikely that
discovery of terra nullius will be used in any circumstances except for
minor islands of the sea or for claims to parts of Antarctica. 35
However, modern cases relating to a prior claim of occupation or
discovery can still arise and require a court to investigate events that
potentially occurred centuries prior. 36 In an advisory opinion, the
International Court of Justice deemed that terra nullius, both as
used in modern times and as used in the period of colonization,
could only refer to lands that were not “inhabited by tribes or
peoples having a social and political organization.” 37 Even other
periods of discovery or occupation often included agreements with
local rulers regarding cession of territory. 38 The modern U.S. view is
that discovery alone does not give title to land—it must be
accompanied by some form of effective occupation. 39
B. Accretion
Accretion refers to natural geological processes that increase
territory—sedimentary deposits on a shoreline or volcanic eruptions
on islands (potentially creating new islands). 40 Accretion also includes
gradual changes in the flow of rivers but not sudden acts that alter
the course of a river, such as avulsion. 41 Accretion also, however,
33. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 687.
34. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 377.
35. Id.
36. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 215.
37. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 ¶ 80 (Oct. 16).
38. Id.
39. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 223.
40. Id. at 240. If such islands are in the high seas, they do not belong to any state and
may be acquired through occupation. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29,
at 698.
41. HILL, supra note 31, at 162–63. In this context, avulsion refers to the sudden
removal of land or soil by floods or changes in the course of a river. Avulsion Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/avulsion (last visited Oct.
17, 2015).
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includes artificial formations such as embankments, dykes, and
similar constructs. 42
C. Cession
It seems that the preferred modern method of acquiring territory
is through treaties with the prior owner of title to the territory in
question. Prior cessions of territory were frequently part of the peace
treaty that a defeated country was forced to sign—while such treaties
were valid in the past, modern treaties are illegitimate if they are
procured under the threat or use of force. 43 Title to territory is often
granted by means of purchase or in exchange for other benefits.44
Indeed, this method also has significant history in the United States,
through the purchases of Louisiana from France, southern Arizona
from Mexico, and Alaska from Russia and through the Adams-Onís
Treaty with Spain granting Florida and the Oregon Treaty with
Great Britain fixing the northern border of the United States. 45
Treaties dividing territory have also been argued in front of the
International Court of Justice regarding Libya and Chad, 46 Botswana
and Namibia, 47 and Indonesia and Malaysia. 48 Access to the
International Court of Justice in settling territorial disputes directly
coincides with the U.N. mandate to settle disputes by peaceful
means. 49 Central to the idea of cession is the principle that a state
cannot transfer more territory than it possesses: nemo dat quod
non habet. 50
D. Conquest
Prior to general prohibitions on the use of force, conquest
frequently resulted in changes to title to territory. 51 Early in the
42. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 29, at 696.
43. Id. at 681.
44. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 365.
45. Id.
46. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
47. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13).
48. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan & Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17).
49. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2.
50. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 227.
51. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 379.
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twentieth century, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Stimson
Doctrine strongly opposed both war as a tool of national policy and
recognition of territorial transfers occurring as a result of war.52
Following the introduction of the U.N. Charter and its general
prohibition on the use of force, 53 the ability to rely on military
conquest to gain title to territory has effectively ended. This
prohibition on conquest was made even clearer in the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relationships and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations. 54 In the declaration, the General Assembly affirmed
the duty of each state to “refrain in its international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State . . . . Such a threat or use of force
constitutes a violation of international law.” 55 In particular, the
declaration noted that the proscription against the use of force
included using it in “territorial disputes and problems concerning
frontiers of States.” 56 Finally, the declaration states that:
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the
provisions of the Charter. The Territory of a State shall not be the
object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or
use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or
use of force shall be recognized as legal. 57

Thus, while conquest was once an accepted manner of acquiring new
territory, 58 it no longer fits under the legal regime established by the
United Nations and other doctrines of the twentieth century.
52. HILL, supra note 31, at 162.
53. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state.”).
54. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414, 434–35 (1873)
(“Power to acquire territory either by conquest or treaty is vested by the Constitution in the
United States. Conquered territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation
until the fate of the nation from which it is conquered is determined, but if the nation is
entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of occupation
becomes permanent, and the title vests absolutely in the conqueror. Complete conquest, by
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E. Prescription
Similar to common law principles of adverse possession,
international law recognizes prescription, or the transfer of title after
a second state effectively and peacefully administers the territory. 59
This was affirmed in a dispute between the United States and the
Netherlands. 60 The Court of Arbitration examined the history of the
Island of Palmas and determined that prior to the grant of the island
to the United States by Spain, title had passed to the Netherlands
because of the long, continuous, and peaceful period of sovereignty
that the Netherlands Indian Government exercised and displayed
with regard to the island. 61 The general requirements of prescription
are: (1) displays of state authority without recognition of other state
sovereignty; (2) public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession; and
(3) persisting possession (that is, over a period of many years). 62 In
addition, the original title holder must acquiesce to the possession by
the new state: this acquiescence can be both positive (an express
declaration that the state believes the new state holds title) or
negative (an absence of activity by the former title holder in the area
and a lack of protesting against the purported new owner). 63
III. SELF-DETERMINATION AND UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS
OF INDEPENDENCE
One of the key questions regarding the events that occurred in
Crimea is the legality of Crimea’s declaration of independence from
Ukraine. The starting point in analyzing the referendum that
occurred in Crimea and the subsequent declaration of independence
by the Crimean legislature is the Constitution of Ukraine. However,
international law recognizes that there are times when unilateral
whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights of the former government, or
in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute
owner of the property conquered from the enemy, nation, or state. His rights are no longer
limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to
all the property and rights of the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and
real property.”) (internal citations omitted).
59. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 25, at 383.
60. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
61. Id. at 866–71.
62. CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 231.
63. Id. at 232.
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declarations of independence may be legal despite domestic law. In
analyzing these events, two cases are of prime importance—the
Canadian Supreme Court’s analysis of the situation in Quebec in
1998 64 and the International Court of Justice’s analysis of the
Kosovo situation in 2010. 65 Both of these cases help to show the
current international law framework regarding the unilateral
declaration of independence of a portion of a country against the
country’s wishes.
A. Ukrainian Law
The Constitution of Ukraine provides that the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea has the authority to “organise and hold [] local
referendums” 66 and recognizes that referendums are an expression of
the will of the populace. 67 In accordance with this, the Constitution
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea grants the Supreme Rada of
Crimea the power to “mak[e] . . . a decision about holding a
republican (local) referendum”68 and “set[] up and hold[] . . .
republican (local) referendums concerning questions left to the
direction of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.” 69 For the
referendum to be legal, it would need to address a matter that is
authorized to Crimea under the Constitution of Ukraine.70
Furthermore, the Constitution of Ukraine is supreme over the
Constitution of Crimea and acts of the Supreme Rada of Crimea. 71
The Constitution of Ukraine states that “Ukraine shall be a unitary
state”; that the “territory of Ukraine within its present borders shall

64. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
65. Accordance with Int’l Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indep. in Respect of
Kos., Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22).
66. KONSTYTUTSIIA UKRAINY [KONST. UKR.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 138(2) (Ukr.),
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/document/110977042/Constitution_eng.doc (official translation).
67. Id. art. 69.
68. KONSTITUTSIIA
AVTONOMNOI
RESPUBLIKI
KRYM
[KONST.
ARK]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 26(2)(3) (Crimea), http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_
constit.html (translation by author).
69. Id. art. 18(1)(7) (translation by author).
70. KONST. UKR. art. 134.
71. Id. art. 135; see also KONST. ARK art. 28 (“The regulatory-legal acts of the
Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea . . . concerning matters . . . shall be
made in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws, the acts of the
President of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine . . . .”).
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be indivisible and inviolable”; 72 and that the “territorial structure of
Ukraine shall be based on the principles of unity and integrity of the
State territory [and] the combination of centralization and
decentralization in the exercise of the state power.” 73 Crimea is an
important part of Ukraine’s territory and is described as “an integral
constituent part of Ukraine.” 74 In addition, the Ukrainian
Constitution directly addresses potential changes in its territorial
boundaries: “[a]lterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be
resolved exclusively by the All-Ukrainian referendum.” 75 Finally, any
changes to the Crimean Constitution must be approved by the
Supreme Rada of Ukraine. 76
B. Quebec
The Canadian Supreme Court had the opportunity to address
three questions with regard to Quebec: (1) whether Quebec could
unilaterally secede from Canada under the Constitution of Canada;
(2) whether international law and the right to self-determination
allow Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada; (3) if there is a
conflict between domestic and international law on the right of
Quebec to unilaterally secede from Canada, whether domestic or
international law takes precedence in Canada. 77 Because the Court
found no conflict between domestic and international law regarding
Quebec’s right to secede, the Court did not address the third
question. 78 While the determination of the Court regarding
Canadian law is not entirely relevant to the present discussion, the
analysis of international law provided is quite beneficial in
determining the status of Crimea’s actions. One point from its
discussion of Canadian law is quite relevant to the situation in
Ukraine—even a clear majority of Quebecers voting in favor of
secession would not change the legality of the action under Canadian

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

KONST. UKR. art. 2.
Id. art. 132.
Id. art. 134.
Id. art. 73 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 135.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 218 (Can.).
Id. at 223.
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domestic law. 79 This is so regardless of the strength of the majority
voting in favor of secession. 80 However, a clear majority voting in
favor of secession would need to be addressed by negotiations
among the provinces of Canada in order to allow Quebec to secede,
if it could do so while still respecting the rights of others and finding
a proper reconciliation of the majority of the population of Quebec
and the majority of the population of Canada. 81 “The continued
existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order cannot
remain indifferent to the clear expression of a clear majority of
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada.” 82 Quebec
could suggest secession and then seek to obtain it through a process
of negotiations with the other provinces of Canada. 83
The Canadian Supreme Court determined that unilateral
secession is only applicable in international law “where ‘a people’ is
governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is subject to
alien subjugation, domination[,] or exploitation; and possibly where
‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination within the state of which it forms a part.” 84 If none of
these apply, “peoples are expected to achieve self-determination
within the framework of their existing state.” 85 If the government of
a state “represents [all] of the people . . . within its territory . . .
equal[ly] and without discrimination,” it “is entitled to maintain its
territorial integrity” and expect that other states will recognize that
integrity. 86 While an unconstitutional declaration of secession could
possibly lead to a de facto secession, the viability of that secession
would require recognition by the international community. 87
In addressing the second question, the Court notes that
“international law does not specifically grant component parts of
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

1858

See id. at 220–21.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222–23.
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‘parent’ state.” 88 Because international law does not specifically grant
a right of unilateral secession nor explicitly deny the right, it seems to
defer to domestic law for determination of the circumstances in
which an entity could secede from a state. 89 Self-determination poses
a notable exception to this general principle in certain
circumstances. 90 However, the general rule is that self-determination
must be exercised in accordance with the sovereignty of existing
states and their territorial integrity. 91
When the right of self-determination is pursued through internal
means (within the existing state), there is, in general, no conflict.
External self-determination, however, can be exercised “in only the
most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances.” 92 In particular, the right to self-determination does
not “authoriz[e] or encourag[e]” actions “that would dismember or
impair . . . the territorial integrity or political unity” of an existing
independent state. 93 The main exceptions to the prohibition on
external self-determination are colonial and oppressed peoples
(including those subject to alien subjugation). 94 A third potential
avenue for asserting a right to external self-determination relates to
the prior two in that people may be “blocked from the meaningful
exercise of [their] right to self-determination internally.” 95 While the
Canadian Supreme Court did not determine whether this third
circumstance actually created a right to unilateral secession, it found
that the situation in Quebec clearly did not approach the threshold:
Quebecers were not being attacked physically or suffering violations
of their fundamental rights. 96 Furthermore, Quebecers had served as
the Prime Minister of Canada for eighty percent of the prior fifty
years and held significant positions at all levels of government and
were adequately represented in all branches of government. 97

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 277.
Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 280–81.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
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Because Quebec was not “denied meaningful access to government
to pursue [its] political, economic, social[,] and cultural
development,” it had no “right, under international law, to secede
unilaterally from Canada.” 98
Finally, the Court acknowledged that a region may illegally
secede, but then achieve legitimacy through international
recognition. 99 While international law could adapt to recognize the
new political and factual reality, this would not affect the legality of
the actions taken by the region in unilaterally seceding. 100 The fact
that an act may eventually be legally recognized does not grant a
right to engage in the act initially. 101
C. Kosovo
The International Court of Justice received a request from the
General Assembly of the United Nations to rule on whether
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in
February 2008 was in accordance with international law. 102 Prior to
the declaration, the Security Council had passed resolutions and
regulations regarding the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. 103
Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted to end the
humanitarian issues that had been identified and the armed conflict
that was occurring in Kosovo. 104 Of note, the resolution enabled the
“Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence in
Kosovo,” which would help with the establishment of self-governing
institutions. 105 The resolution attempted to end the violence and
repression that were occurring in Kosovo at the hands of Yugoslavia
and required the withdrawal of military and police forces from
Kosovo. 106 Furthermore, the international civil presence was tasked
with “[p]romoting the . . . autonomy and self-government in
98. Id. at 287.
99. Id. at 288.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 291.
102. Accordance with Int’l Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indep. in Respect of
Kos., Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 407 (July 22).
103. Id. at 426, ¶ 57.
104. Id. at 426, ¶ 58.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Kosovo.” 107 Starting in 2005, the Secretary-General and the Security
Council decided that the final status of Kosovo should be
determined. 108 In the ensuing months, “delegations of Serbia and
Kosovo addressed . . . Kosovo’s governmental and administrative
functions, cultural heritage and religious sites, economic issues, and
community rights,” but were not close to agreement on most of the
issues. 109 Despite additional sessions, the two groups were not able to
progress in the negotiations. 110 Because of the inability of the parties
to come to a bilateral agreement, the Secretary-General and his
Special Envoy decided “that the only viable option for Kosovo [was]
independence, to be supervised . . . by the international
community,” and drafted a procedure by which the Kosovo
Constitution could be created. 111 Despite the support of the Special
Envoy and the Secretary-General, the Security Council was unable to
come to a consensus on the future disposition of Kosovo. 112 In
February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a declaration of
independence, 113 making reference to the recommendations of the
Special Envoy. 114 Serbia did not recognize the declaration and stated
that the declaration was unlawful. 115
In ascertaining the legality of the declaration of independence,
the International Court of Justice applied both general international
law and Security Council resolution 1244. 116 During the early
periods of modern statehood, from the eighteenth century through
the early twentieth century, there were many instances of regions
declaring independence from a parent state, with no evidence that
such a practice was considered contrary to international law. 117
Furthermore, with the creation of the United Nations, the principle
of self-determination was given a more prominent role, particularly

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 427, ¶ 59.
Id. at 430, ¶ 64.
Id. at 431, ¶ 67.
Id. at 431, ¶ 68.
Id. at 432, ¶¶ 69–70.
Id. at 433, ¶ 71.
Id. at 434, ¶ 74.
Id. at 434, ¶ 75.
Id. at 435, ¶ 77.
Id. at 436, ¶ 78.
Id. at 436, ¶ 79.
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as it related to the right of independence for people in colonial
territories and those “subject to alien subjugation, domination[,]
and exploitation.” 118 And, while the Security Council had at various
times condemned declarations of independence, those declarations
were made regarding specific conditions that existed at the time of
the declaration. 119 Because there is no general prohibition of
declarations of independence, the Court held that Kosovo’s
declaration was in accordance with international law. 120
Looking to Security Council Resolution 1244, the Court noted
that the international civil and security presence superseded the legal
system in place in Kosovo at the time, instead setting up an
international administration. 121 This legal regime was designed to
help the development of local self-governance in Kosovo and
specifically was not intended to serve as a permanent governmental
institution, although it did supersede the Serbian legal system in
place at the time of its introduction. 122 Because the resolution only
contained provisions relating to the interim status of Kosovo and not
its final status, the Court reasoned that the resolution did not restrict
the ability of Kosovo to become independent—in part because only
nineteen days after adopting resolution 1244, the Security Council
used specific language in resolution 1251 to set the conditions
relating to the final status of Cyprus. 123
D. Crimea’s Referendum
When applying both domestic and international law to the
referendum and referendum process in Crimea, several problems are
apparent. The actual referendum itself is flawed for several reasons.
The substance of the referendum was not a valid topic for Crimea to
vote on. The referendum allowed two options: vote in favor of
joining Russia as a new subject of the Russian Federation or restore
the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and remain a

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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part of Ukraine. 124 Joining Russia would necessarily involve seceding
from Ukraine. As noted above, the Ukrainian Constitution states
that the territorial integrity of the country, including Crimea as an
integral part, is a fundamental principle of the country. Because the
Ukrainian Constitution is supreme over the Crimean Constitution
and acts of the Supreme Rada of Crimea, a referendum that could
result in a violation of the Ukrainian Constitution could not be valid.
Even more on point, the Ukrainian Constitution specifically states
that changes to its territory must be resolved by a pan-Ukrainian
referendum, not a referendum in the area that wishes to break away.
Because the referendum could alter the territory of Ukraine, it was
only the proper subject of an All-Ukrainian referendum, not an AllCrimean referendum. The second option in the referendum,
resulting in a return to the 1992 Constitution, does not suffer the
same constitutional problems as does the first choice. However,
based on the Constitution of Ukraine, changes to the Constitution
of Crimea must be approved by Supreme Rada of Ukraine—the
referendum vote would not change the Constitution of Crimea until
approved by the central government of Ukraine. Thus, the
referendum in Crimea did not comply with Ukrainian law.
However, as noted by both the Supreme Court of Canada and
the International Court of Justice, a declaration of independence
that does not comport with domestic law may still be valid under
international law. The facts of this situation, however, do not fit the
criteria of either court. Under the reasoning of the Canadian
Supreme Court, Crimea would only be able to secede if the citizens
were being denied their right to exercise self-determination within
Ukraine. This simply is not evidenced by the situation in Crimea.
Indeed, Crimea in general had more autonomy than did other
regions of Ukraine because of its special status as an Autonomous
Republic. 125 Using the same analysis as the Canadian Supreme Court,
Crimeans were not, despite Russia’s assertions, suffering human

124. Biulleten’ dlia golosovaniia na obshchekrymskom referendume 16 marta 2014 goda
[Bulletin for the Vote on the all-Crimean Referendum of March 16, 2014], Verkhovnaia Rada
Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krym, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/
2014_Crimean_referendum_ballot.png.
125. See KONST. UKR. arts. 134–39 (detailing the powers and authority granted to
Crimea and its ability to enact regulation in a wide field of areas).
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rights violations. 126 While Crimeans have not had the same political
representation as Quebecers (that is, Prime Minister for eighty
percent of the prior fifty years), there is nothing to suggest that they
do not receive proportional representation in Ukraine’s
governmental bodies. Crimeans had access both to their local
government and to the Ukrainian government—there was no
systematic repression of the Crimean people. 127
The ruling of the International Court of Justice provides a more
compelling case for Russia. President Putin cited Kosovo as the
inspiration behind the Crimean referendum. 128 There are several
glaring distinctions between the two scenarios. The actions taken in
Kosovo were multilateral in nature: the U.N., NATO, and other
organizations all worked towards the Kosovo secession. 129 Because
Russia initially blocked any Security Council action against Serbia,
NATO acted alone to counter Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing. 130 The
U.N. Security Council brought Kosovo under its supervision with

126. Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in Ukr., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/75 (Sept. 19, 2014), at Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 19, 21–22 [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in
Ukraine]; see also U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7138th mtg., supra note 23, at 5 (comments of the
French delegate, noting the lack of any violence against the Russian minorities, despite Russia’s
claims otherwise).
127. Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, supra note 126, at Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 4 (noting that there were some attacks against
ethnic Russians, but “these were neither systematic nor widespread”).
128. Ilya Somin, Why the Kosovo “Precedent” Does Not Justify Russia’s Annexation of
Crimea, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/crimea-kosovo-and-false-moral-equivalency/. One cannot help
but see some perverse humor in the “Kosovo precedent” cited by President Putin, considering
that Russia immediately recognized Crimea’s independence but still refuses to recognize
Kosovo. Putin Compares Kosovo’s 2008 Independence to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea; Others
Disagree, FOX NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/19/putincompares-kosovo-2008-independence-to-russia-annexation-crimea-others/
(noting
that
despite using Kosovo as a precedent, Serbian officials believe Russia will never recognize
Kosovo and will continue blocking it from becoming a member of the U.N.); Stephen Wilson,
IOC Grants Full Olympic Recognition to Kosovo, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:13 AM),
http://news.yahoo.com/ioc-grants-full-olympic-recognition-kosovo-104150520.html
(noting that more than one hundred nations have recognized Kosovo but Russia has not).
129. Experts: Crimea Isn’t Comparable to Kosovo, ANADOLU AGENCY (Mar. 17, 2014,
18:16),
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/302263--experts-crimea-isnt-comparableto-kosovo.
130. Valentina Pop, Merkel: Comparing Crimea to Kosovo is ‘Shameful,’ EUOBSERVER
(Mar. 13, 2014, 11:34 AM), https://euobserver.com/foreign/123454.
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the passage of Security Council Resolution 1244 because of the crisis
occurring there, including the acts committed by Serbia against the
Albanians. 131 In contrast, the actions taken in Crimea have been
unilaterally the actions of Russia. Furthermore, Kosovo was
undergoing a humanitarian crisis—no evidence of a similar crisis with
respect to ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers has been found in
Crimea. 132 Kosovo was experiencing “extensive and systematic
discrimination and violation of human rights,” while in Crimea
“there really [was] no humanitarian crisis” despite Russia’s insistence
that Russian-speakers were in danger. 133 Indeed, there may be
evidence to the contrary. 134 The eventual independence of Kosovo
was the product of nearly a decade of negotiation and international
oversight: the process in Crimea was dominated by Russia and
completed in a matter of weeks. Finally, the Security Council has
deemed various declarations of independence invalid on the basis of

131. Interview by Jonathan Masters with John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow
for Int’l & Nat’l Sec. Law, Why the Crimean Referendum Is Illegitimate, COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL.
(Mar.
16,
2014),
http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/why-crimean-referendumillegitimate/p32594.
132. Experts: Crimea isn’t comparable to Kosovo, supra note 129.
133. Id. (quoting Neil Melvin from the Stockholm International Peace Institute).
134. Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine, supra note 126, at 8 (noting that residents
in Crimea known for being “pro-Ukrainian” face intimidation and discrimination, Crimean
Tatar leaders have been banned from entering Crimea, and there has been a deterioration with
respect to freedom of expression, among other rights); see also Evgenii Bobrov, Problemy
zhitelei Kryma [The Problems of the Inhabitants of Crimea], Sovet pri Prezidente Rossiiskoi
Federatsii po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka [Council of the
President of the Russian Federation on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights]
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://president-sovet.ru/members/blogs/bobrov_e_a/problemy-zhiteleykryma-/ (detailing how in the aftermath of the referendum, the only Ukrainian language high
school in Simferopol was being changed to a Russian language school, the only UkrainianTatar philology department at a federal university was being closed, the relationships between
Ukrainians and Russians had turned more severe, the government decided to liquidate the
Kiev Orthodox Church, and the government reclassified Islam from a church to a protest
ideology because some literature that was allowed in Ukraine is considered “extremist” in
Russia). More recently, a Crimean Tatar TV station was pulled from the air after applying four
times to re-register with Russia’s media regulator. Richard Balmforth & Pavel Polityuk,
Silencing of Crimean Tatar TV Sparks Outcry from Rights Bodies, Ukraine, Turkey, REUTERS
(Apr. 3, 2015, 7:17 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/03/us-ukrainecrisis-crimea-idUSKBN0MU0R520150403. Each time the license application was turned
down for alleged mistakes, but Tatars view the refusal as retaliation for their critical stance
against Russian rule. Id. Human rights organizations have claimed that this is just the latest in
a series of moves to stifle Crimean Tatar media outlets and pro-Ukrainian media, with several
journalists critical of the authorities being subject to raids, harassment, and detainment. Id.
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the specific conditions that existed at the time of the declaration.
This necessitates looking to the conditions that existed during the
referendum to see if there is any reason to doubt the validity of
Crimea’s declaration of independence.
Prior to the referendum, Russia unilaterally entered Crimea with
its military force, with thousands of Russian troops occupying the
peninsula. 135 In addition, an independent newspaper in Russia,
Novaya Gazeta, published what it purported to be a strategic Russian
document from prior to Yanukovych’s loss of power. 136 The
purported report claims that Russia “risks losing, not simply the
Ukrainian market for the supply of energy, but, what is much more
dangerous, even indirect control over the gas transportation system
in Ukraine.” 137 This would harm the position of Gazprom and
significantly hurt the economy of Russia. 138 The document further
mentions that, because of the current conditions in Kiev and the
impending failure of Yanukovych, the Russian government needed to
reinforce the goals of those who are seeking to join Russia,
particularly in the eastern regions (including Crimea) to encourage
them to initiate a reunification with Russia. 139 In addition, the
document claims that Russia needed to create conditions in Crimea
and the east that would give the process political legitimacy and a
moral justification, and it needed to create a PR campaign to stress
the reactionary nature of Russia’s actions. 140 Finally, the report details
the necessity of preparing conditions in Crimea and Kharkiv for
holding referenda about greater self-governance and eventual
opportunities to join Russia. 141 Noticeably absent from the document
are any justifications for Russia’s actions on the basis of historical ties

135. David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep
Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/
europe/crimea-ukraine-secession-vote-referendum.html?_r=0.
136. See Andrei Lipskii, Editorial, Predstavliaetsia pravil’nym initsirovat’ prisoedinenie
vostochnykh oblastei Ukrainy k Rossii [It is Right to Initiate the Accession of the Eastern Regions of
Ukraine to Russia], NOVAYA GAZETA (Feb. 24, 2015, 15:56:00), http://www.
novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html.
137. Id. (translation by author).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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or the protection of ethnic Russians. 142 Putin has admitted that he
“ordered special forces, marines and paratroopers to be deployed
‘under the guise of reinforcing our military facilities in Crimea.’” 143
This seems to indicate that the impetus for annexation was not
driven by Crimea, but rather by Russia. 144
For at least a week prior to the referendum, Ukrainian television
stations were no longer accessible to Crimeans—Crimeans were
limited to Russian stations that strongly criticized the “nationalists”
and “bandits” in Kiev. 145 In addition, the election “observers” from
European right-wing parties seemed to turn a blind eye to signs of
irregularity in the voting process: despite clear evidence of the
military in the streets and one-sided advertising on the billboards,
some claimed that they could not “see any evidence of pressure,
propaganda[,] or military influence.” 146 The Levada Center, which
conducts polling in Ukraine and Russia, found that “[t]he twoweek-long propaganda and disinformation campaign . . . has had a
powerful effect. . . . All alternative, non-official or independent
sources of information and interpretation of the developments have
been completely shut down.”147 In addition, it seems that Russia may
have sent in professional agitators to stir up tensions in
eastern Ukraine. 148
Although Crimean officials had invited the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe to observe the referendum, the

142. Id.
143. Michael Birnbaum, Putin Was Surprised at How Easily Russia Took Control of
Crimea, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
putin-was-surprised-at-how-easily-russia-took-control-of-crimea/2015/03/15/94b7c82ec9c1-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html.
144. Id.
145. Andreas Brenner, Referendum Day in Crimea’s Simferopol, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.dw.de/referendum-day-in-crimeas-simferopol/a-17500378.
146. Id. (quoting Johann Gudenus, a member of parliament in Vienna who was invited
to observe the referendum).
147. Interview by Kathy Lally with Sergei Markedonov, Assoc. Professor of Reg’l Studies
& Foreign Policy, Russian State Univ. for the Humanities, Crimean Independence Vote and
Russian Annexation: A Primer, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/world/crimean-independence-vote-and-russian-annexation-aprimer/2014/03/14/22efa5cd-fbd6-4d3a-bebd-a85847c5fdec_story.html.
148. Luke Harding & Shaun Walker, Crimea Applies to Be Part of Russian Federation
After Vote to Leave Ukraine, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2014, 8:06 EDT), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result.
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group declined to do so because the security and human rights
organization deemed the referendum illegal. 149 The chair of the
OSCE noted that the referendum contradicted both Ukrainian law
and international law and thus was not valid—“the basic criteria for a
decision in a constitutional framework were not met.” 150 This
followed several unsuccessful attempts by OSCE military observers
to enter to investigate the alleged human rights abuses being
perpetrated in the area. 151 During the referendum, Russian troops,
rather than a neutral, multinational force such as that present in
Kosovo, monitored the situation. 152 The Venice Commission in
particular noted “the massive public presence of (para)military
forces,” OSCE concerns regarding “freedom of expression,” the
short time period “between the decision to call the referendum and
the referendum itself,” doubts about the “neutrality of the
authorities” (they passed a declaration of independence five days
prior to the referendum), and the phrasing of the referendum
question, which was not neutral, as being counter to European
democratic standards. 153 Every ballot sheet led with the option of
joining Russia, which has been shown to inflate vote totals even in
legitimate elections. 154 Furthermore, in at least one instance, a

149. Fredrik Dahl, Crimea Referendum Illegal, No OSCE Monitoring - Swiss, FIRSTPOST
(Mar. 12, 2014, 1:45 IST), http://www.firstpost.com/world/crimea-referendum-illegal-noosce-monitoring-swiss-1429931.html.
150. Id.
151. Id.; Peter Graff, Warning Shots Fired as OSCE Mission Turned away from Crimea,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2014, 9:47 AM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/usosce-shots-idUSBREA270HJ20140308; Thwarted Crimea Mission of OSCE Observers,
EURONEWS (Mar. 15, 2014, 00:21 CET), http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/15/
thwarted-crimea-mission-of-osce-observers/.
152. Experts: Crimea isn’t comparable to Kosovo, supra note 129.
153. Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea in Ukraine to Organise a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the
Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is Compatible with
Constitutional Principles, Opinion, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), 98th Plen. Sess., at 5, Opinion No. 762/2014 (Mar. 21, 2014).
154. Carl Bialik, Many Signs Pointed to Crimea Independence Vote—But Polls Didn’t,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:38 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/manysigns-pointed-to-crimea-independence-vote-but-polls-didnt/.
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journalist engaged in an activity that might be seen as pro-Ukrainian
faced pressure from “local defense squads.” 155
While official sources indicate that approval for the referendum
initiative joining Crimea with Russia was over ninety-nine percent,156
some internal Russian sources express doubt about the validity of the
numbers. 157 For example, a website post on the official page of the
Council of the President of the Russian Federation on the
Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, which contains a
lengthy disclaimer from the Council indicating that the post reflects
only the author’s views (and opinions of those he interviewed) and
not the official views of the Council, and whose author travelled to
Crimea about a month after the referendum, expresses serious doubt
concerning the official results of the election. 158 The opinion of
“almost all respondent[] experts and citizens” was that most people
in Sevastopol voted in favor of joining Russia (fifty-to-eighty
percent). 159 However, only about fifty-to-sixty percent of voters in
Crimea as a whole were in favor of joining Russia with an overall
participation rate of between thirty and fifty percent. 160 These
numbers are significantly lower than those officially reported
numbers of greater than ninety-five percent approval and eighty
percent participation. 161 In addition, it appears that Crimeans voted
for an end to the “corrupt lawlessness and thieving dominance of the
Donetsk stooges,” rather than for joining Russia. 162
Other sources within Crimea seem to support the findings of
inappropriate activities with regards to the voting procedures: one
report indicates that Sevastopol experienced over one hundred

155. Charles McPhedran & Anna Arutunyan, Crimea Votes to Join Russia; Ukrainians
Prepare for War, USA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:37 AM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2014/03/16/crimea-referendum-ukraine-russia/6484251/.
156. Morello, Constable & Faiola, supra note 10.
157. Bobrov, supra note 134.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
162. Bobrov, supra note 134 (translation by author). However, once again Sevastopol
differs from Crimea as a whole—the residents voted specifically for unification with Russia. Id.
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percent voter turnout 163 while another indicates that the actual
overall turnout in Crimea could not have exceeded thirty percent. 164
This also seems to comport with the experiences of some of the
minority groups in Crimea: many citizens opposed to the vote,
notably Crimean Tatars who make up about twelve percent of the
population, chose “to stay home rather than participate in what they
called a rigged vote.” 165 In addition, many Crimeans loyal to Ukraine
did not vote in the referendum, 166 most likely, at least in part,
because choosing to maintain the status quo with Ukraine was not
even an option. 167 Furthermore, it seems as though many ethnic
Ukrainians chose not to vote in the election. 168 Some potential voters
who wished to remain with Crimea chose not to vote because they
believed that the referendum did not give them a “choice to vote
against joining the KGB-run government” and because they did not
feel safe voting surrounded by Russian troops. 169
That is not to say that Russia is not correct on several fronts.
While Putin’s “claim[] that the Russian-speaking population in
Crimea was being terrorized by rampant ultranationalist and radical
groups” 170 was false, there were attempts by the legislature in Kiev to
undo the law protecting regional languages (that is, Russian in
Crimea). 171 Although the law was ultimately not signed, the attempts
further alienated and incensed the relationships between Ukrainians
and Russians in Crimea. 172
Furthermore, the ouster of president Yanukovych likely did not
comply with the Ukrainian Constitution. Both Russia and former

163. Over 123% of Sevastopol Residents Vote to Join Russia!, EUROMAIDAN (Mar. 17,
2014),
https://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/03/17/over-123-of-sevastopolresidents-vote-to-join-russia/.
164. Tatar Leader Says Crimean Tatars Boycotted “Referendum,” EUROMAIDAN (Mar.
17,
2014),
http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/17/tatar-leader-says-crimean-tatarsboycotted-phony-referendum/.
165. Herszenhorn, supra note 135.
166. Crimea Exit Poll: About 93% Back Russia Union, BBC (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26598832.
167. Herszenhorn, supra note 135.
168. Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14.
169. McPhedran & Arutunyan, supra note 155.
170. Herszenhorn, supra note 135.
171. Crimean Independence Vote and Russian Annexation: A Primer, supra note 147.
172. Id.
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president Yanukovych considered the actions resulting in his
departure from Ukraine as a coup and expressed concerns that the
new leadership in Ukraine was “fascist-minded and likely to crack
down on Ukraine’s ethnic Russian population.” 173 The Ukrainian
Constitution provides that the term of the president will only end
early in the event of resignation, inability to fulfill the duties due to
health reasons, removal from office by impeachment, or death.174
Resignation must be personally announced at a meeting of the
Supreme Rada, 175 and impeachment is only applicable if the president
commits treason or another crime. 176 The process of impeachment
requires several steps, including an investigating commission, a
three-quarters vote to remove the president from office, and an
opinion by the Supreme Court of Ukraine stating that the acts of
which the president is accused are treason or another crime. 177 Even
assuming that the quick process used by the legislature had the
necessary investigating commission and an opinion by the Supreme
Court, the legislature clearly lacked the three-quarters vote with only
328 out of 447 members (seventy-three percent) voting to
impeach. 178 However, even this complaint ignores the similarly
suspect coup that led to Sergey Aksyonov, a former crime boss,
coming to power in Crimea. 179 Russia acted at least partially on the
basis of Aksyonov’s request, despite his status as an unofficial leader
of Crimea. 180 Furthermore, even acknowledging Yanukovych as the
legitimate president of Ukraine does not substantially help Russia’s
argument—he specifically did not request that Russia dismember
173. Heintz, supra note 17.
174. KONST. UKR. art. 108.
175. Id. art. 109.
176. Id. art. 111.
177. Id.
178. John Balouziyeh, Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: An Analysis under the Principles
of Jus ad Bellum, LEXISNEXIS: INT’L L. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2014, 08:09 AM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-blog/
archive/2014/04/14/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-an-analysis-under-the-principles-of-jusad-bellum.aspx.
179. Ilya Somin, Crimea and the Morality of Secession, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014/03/07/crimea-and-the-morality-of-secession/.
180. Ukraine Crisis: Crimea Leader Appeals to Putin for Help, BBC (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26397323 (noting that Russia would “not leave
unnoticed” Aksyonov’s request).
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Ukraine and annex Crimea, but instead considered it a
“major tragedy.” 181
Considering Ukrainian domestic law and the standards of
Reference re Secession of Quebec and Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Crimea’s unilateral secession is not justified by either
domestic law or by international law. The referendum and Russia’s
influence on the process make the declaration of independence
highly suspect—there were no valid reasons to ram the process
through in such a quick manner.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S ACQUISITION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law derived from a variety of sources points against
the legality of Russia’s actions with respect to Ukraine and Crimea.
Importantly, the United Nations Charter and General Assembly
Resolutions, several treaties between Russia and Ukraine, and the
Budapest Memorandum all present Russia with obligations to
respect the territorial boundaries of Ukraine.
A. The United Nations
One of the main purposes of the United Nations is “[t]he
“develop[ment of] friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”182
and promoting higher standards of living, human rights, and full
employment “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples.” 183 This idea was further stated in
Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which states that “[a]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
181. Ukraine Crisis: Viktor Yanukovych Decries Crimea ‘Tragedy,’ BBC (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26857734 (noting that “had [Yanukovych]
remained in power, he would have tried to prevent the referendum”).
182. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
183. Id. art. 55.
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political status and freely pursue their economic, social[,] and
cultural development.” 184 However, the United Nations has also
recognized limits to the right of self-determination:
[The right of self-determination] shall not be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction of any kind. 185

Furthermore, as already noted above, General Assembly
Resolution 2625 (XXV) essentially confirmed the status of conquest
as an illegitimate method of acquiring land, in particular stating that
“[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force
shall be recognized as legal” and that attempts to disrupt national
and territorial unity or to interfere in the domestic affairs of another
nation are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. 186
The illegitimacy of conquest as a method for acquiring land was
further affirmed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 187 The participating states,
including the Soviet Union, agreed to “respect each other’s
sovereign equality . . . including . . . the right . . . to territorial
integrity,”188 “refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or
direct or indirect use of force,” 189 “regard as inviolable all one
another’s frontiers” and “refrain from any demand for, or act of,
seizure and usurpation of part . . . of the territory of any
participating State,” 190 “respect the territorial integrity of each of the
participating States,” “refrain from making each other’s territory the

184. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
185. G.A. Res. 50/6, at 3 (Nov. 9, 1995).
186. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 54.
187. Final Act Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975.
188. Id. at (1)(a)(I.).
189. Id. at (II.).
190. Id. at (III.).
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object of military occupation,” 191 and “refrain from any
intervention . . . in the internal . . . affairs falling within the domestic
jurisdiction of another participating State.” 192
The United Nations Charter is founded upon peaceable
resolution of disputes. 193 One of the key elements of maintaining
peace is the respect that each state is required to have for the
territorial integrity of other states. 194 The attempted response of the
Security Council 195 and the actual response of the General
Assembly196 to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine indicate the overall
view of international law, and particularly the view of the United
Nations: while self-determination is a valid interest of peoples, it is
not carte blanche to intervene in the affairs of another state,
recognize the secession of part of that state, and then annex the
newly “independent” state.
B. Treaties between Russia and Ukraine
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine
signed several treaties regarding their relationship to each other and
the conditions for Russia’s continued use of its naval bases in
Sevastopol. Two treaties in particular detail Russia’s obligations
towards Ukraine with respect to its territorial integrity and
sovereignty: the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and the Partition
Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet
(extended by the Kharkiv Pact).
The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between
the Russian Federation and Ukraine was signed in May 1997, ratified
in March 1999, and entered into force the next month. 197 Of

191. Id. at (IV.).
192. Id. at (VI.).
193. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3.
194. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
195. S.C. Draft Res. S/2014/189, supra note 22.
196. G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 24.
197. Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i partnerstve mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i
Ukrainoi [Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian Federation
and Ukraine], Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV
(Bulletin of International Treaties) 1999, Nо. 7 (Russ.). Interestingly, Ukraine registered the
treaty with the U.N. on October 2, 2014. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership
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particular note, the treaty states that the two countries will “honour
each other’s territorial integrity and . . . acknowledge the inviolability
of the borders existing between them” 198 and that the relationship
between the two countries is founded “on the principles of mutual
respect; sovereign equality; territorial integrity; inviolability of borders;
peaceful settlement of dispute; non-use of force or threat of force; . . .
[and] non-interference in internal affairs [of the other country].”199
Furthermore, the countries agreed to abstain from taking part in or
supporting any actions directed against the other country and from
“enter[ing] into any agreement with third countries that is directed
against the other.” 200 While the treaty originally had a duration of ten
years, it automatically renewed unless one of the two contracting states
notified the other of its desire to end the treaty. 201
The two countries also agreed to the Partition Treaty on the
Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet to establish Russia’s
ability to use Sevastopol and other military bases in Crimea. It was
similarly agreed to in May 1997 and entered into force in July
1999. 202 Once again, Russia agreed to “respect the sovereignty of
Ukraine, obey its laws, and not allow interference in the internal
business of Ukraine.” 203 Furthermore, keeping the fleet in the Black
Sea “must not contradict the laws of Ukraine,” 204 and the military
units that Ukraine has allowed on its territory should only conduct
exercises within the areas that have been specifically set aside for
Russian troops. 205 This treaty had a term of twenty years, 206 but it was

between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (Russ.-Ukr.), May 31, 1997, U.N.T.S.
Registration Number I-52240. Although no U.N.T.S. volume number has been established
for the treaty, the text in the translation as provided in the U.N. documentation under
registration number I-52240 will be used throughout this paper.
198. Id. art. 2.
199. Id. art. 3.
200. Id. art. 6.
201. Id. art. 40.
202. Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi o statuse i usloviiakh
prebyvaniia Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Partition Treaty
on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet], Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 1997, BIULLETEN’
MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 1999, Nо. 10 (Russ.).
203. Id. art. 6, ¶ 1 (translation by author).
204. Id. art. 6, ¶ 2 (translation by author).
205. Id. art. 8, ¶ 2.
206. Id. art. 25.
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explicitly extended in April 2010 for an additional twenty-five
years. 207 The Kharkiv Pact included in its introduction that the
“Russian Federation and Ukraine, developing their relationships on
the foundation of the principle of strategic partnership, fixed in the
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine” had decided to conclude the treaty
extending the terms of the prior Partition Treaty. 208 Following
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian legislators unilaterally ended
the various Black Sea treaties it had concluded with Ukraine. 209
C. Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were still
significant numbers of nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory. 210 In
an effort to placate Ukraine that its nuclear weapons would not be
needed to defend itself against possible intrusions by other countries,
the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Ukraine came together
and created the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection
with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. 211 Because of the accession of Ukraine to the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and its commitment to eliminate all
207. Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi po voprosam prebyvaniia
Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Agreement Between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Topic of Maintaining the Black Sea Fleet of the
Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine], Russ.-Ukr., art. 1, Apr. 21, 2010,
BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 2010,
Nо. 10 (Russ.) [hereinafter Kharkiv Pact].
208. Id. intro. (translation by author).
209. See Federal’nyi Zakon RF o prekrashchenii deistviia soglashenii, kasaiushchikhsia
prebyvaniia Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy [Federal Law of
the Russian Federation on the Termination of the Action of Agreements Relating to
Maintaining the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 14, Item 1530.
210. Steven Pifer, The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations, BROOKINGS INST.
(Dec. 4, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/12/04budapest-memorandum-us-obligations-pifer.
211. See Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland & the United States of America, Letter dated Dec. 7,
1994 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/765-S/1994/1399
(Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Budapest Memorandum].
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nuclear weapons from its territory, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States “reaffirm[ed] their commitment to Ukraine . . . to
respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of
Ukraine.” 212 Furthermore, the three nations “reaffirm[ed] their
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that
none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in
self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations.” 213 It would seem that one of the key elements
necessary to secure Ukraine’s cooperation in eliminating its nuclear
arsenal was the security assurances provided by Russia and the
other nations. 214
The United States and Russia further cemented their
commitment to Ukraine in a joint statement concerning the
expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms. 215 In the statement, the two countries
recognized the value of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the
success of the START Treaty and “confirm[ed] that the assurances
recorded in the Budapest Memoranda will remain in effect after
December 4, 2009.” 216 Following Russia’s actions in Crimea, the
United States and Ukraine issued a joint statement in which the U.S.
affirmed its commitment to Ukraine and condemned Russia for not
keeping its commitments to Ukraine through its military actions on
the peninsula; 217 however, it is important to note that the United
States has in the past stated that “the Memorandum is not legally
binding” although it “take[s] [the Memorandum’s] political
commitments seriously.” 218

212. Id. at Annex I, ¶ 1.
213. Id. at Annex I, ¶ 2.
214. Pifer, supra note 210.
215. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN, PRN: 2009/1230,
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY (2009).
216. Id.
217. Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, EMBASSY OF UKRAINE IN
HUNGARY, Mar. 25, 2014, http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/20572spilyna-zajava-ukrajini-ta-spoluchenih-shtativ-ameriki.
218. Press Release, Belarus: Budapest Memorandum, U.S. Embassy in Minsk (Apr. 12,
2013), http://minsk.usembassy.gov/budapest_memorandum.html (addressing the Budapest
Memorandum in connection with U.S. sanctions directed towards securing the human rights
of Belarusians, not advantages for the United States).
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D. Application to Russia’s Actions in Ukraine and Its Acquisition
of Crimea
It is hard to see any justification under international law for
Russia’s actions with respect to Crimea. Its obligations to respect
Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders were enshrined
repeatedly in the U.N. Charter, in its treaties with Ukraine, and in
the Budapest Memorandum. Russia had an obligation to respect
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its existing borders. Furthermore,
it had pledged not to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs.
By entering Ukraine under the false pretenses of solving a
humanitarian crisis and by further blockading Ukrainian troops
inside military bases, Russia violated Ukraine’s sovereignty. 219
Furthermore, by recognizing the Crimean referendum and then
absorbing Crimea into itself, Russia did not respect the existing
borders of Ukraine; it instead intentionally modified the borders.
Moreover, while Russia was allowed to have soldiers on Crimea, they
were limited to specific areas and could not be used against
Ukraine’s wishes. 220 Ukraine noted the use of military force in a
manner not consistent with the approved locations or
Ukraine’s wishes. 221
Russia’s strongest arguments that it did not violate the
prohibitions against the use of force and interference in the affairs of
Ukraine are not entirely without merit, but they are ultimately
unpersuasive. President Putin claimed that Russian troops were
necessary to protect the ethnic Russian population from Ukrainian
nationalists. 222 Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to

219. Embassy of Ukraine to Japan, On Violations of Ukraine’s Laws in Force and of
Ukrainian-Russian Agreements by Military Units of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian
Federation in the Territory of Ukraine, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. UKR. (Mar. 3, 2014, 03:57),
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/18622-shhodo-porushenychinnogo-zakonodavstva-ukrajini-ta-ukrajinsyko-rosijsykih-ugod-vijsykovimi-formuvannyamichf-rf-na-teritoriji-ukrajini.
220. Id.
221. Id. (noting a variety of circumstances in which Ukrainian forces were blocked by
servicemen and vessels of the Russian Federation and in which Russian servicemen were
located in areas that had not been approved).
222. Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Situation in
Ukraine, PRESIDENT RUSS. (Mar. 4, 2014, 15:40), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/20366 [hereinafter Putin, Situation in Ukraine]. It is interesting to see Russia’s
arguments in light of President Putin’s remarks concerning Syria. Vladimir V. Putin, Editorial,
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protect might provide some credence to Russia’s legal argument that
it not only had the right to intervene, but also had the obligation to
do so; 223 however, the assertion that Russians were in danger is
simply not supported by the facts evidenced by any non-Russian
sponsored news agencies or humanitarian organizations. 224 Even
Russian agencies do not necessarily support Russia’s assertions that
ethnic Russians were under attack or in danger. 225
Russia has also argued that it had the permission of President
Yanukovych to enter the country to protect the citizens. 226 There is
some validity to this argument. As mentioned above, the
impeachment and removal from office of Yanukovych likely did not
comply with the Ukrainian Constitution. 227 However, even if he were
still ostensibly the head of the Ukrainian government, he likely could
not unilaterally invite in the Russian army for the protection of
Crimeans—at a minimum it would have required the acquiescence of
the legislative body. 228 In addition, after Yanukovych abdicated his
responsibilities and fled, he lost his legitimacy as the president of
Ukraine, which occurred prior to Yanukovych requesting assistance

A Plea for Caution from Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?_r=2 (“[F]orce is
permitted only in self-defense or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is
unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an act of aggression. . . .
It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become
commonplace for the United States.”).
223. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to
Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703 (2006).
224. See, e.g., Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces, HUMAN RTS. WATCH
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearancesillegal-forces (detailing episodes in which pro-Crimean independence forces are attacking and
abducting those in favor of Ukraine, including an incident in which one of the perpetrators
admitted to being a member of Russian security forces); Situation of Human Rights in
Ukraine, supra note 126, at Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014
(noting that while there were attacks against ethnic Russians, they were not widespread nor
systematic, but noting that there were credible allegations of harassment, arrest, and torture
against those who did not support the referendum). Furthermore, one of the human rights
missions to Crimea was turned back by the authorities until March 14. Id. at Report on the
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Apr. 15, 2014, 9.
225. See Bobrov, supra note 134.
226. Putin, Situation in Ukraine, supra note 222.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 174–75.
228. Balouziyeh, supra note 178 (quoting a partner of an international law firm in Kiev).
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from the Russian government. 229 The Ukrainian parliament adopted
this view, declaring that Yanukovych “self-abdicated,” requiring it to
instate an interim government. 230 Regardless, Russia’s actions in
Ukraine overstepped even what Yanukovych would have allowed—
there was no invitation to monitor a referendum to decide whether
Crimea should depart from Ukraine and join Russia nor was there an
invitation to annex Crimea.
None of Russia’s arguments address its other fundamental
obligation to Ukraine—respect for its territorial integrity and its
borders. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that it did not
breach the Budapest Memorandum obligations because “Ukraine’s
loss of its territorial integrity was a result of complicated internal
processes” in which Russia had no part. 231 This is neglecting the
significant part Russia had in “monitoring” the elections, spreading
misinformation about the dangers posed by Ukraine to ethnic
Russians, and the further damage it did to Ukraine by
acknowledging the results of the referendum. In essence, Russia
claims that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was lost by the referendum,
not by its acknowledgement of the referendum or subsequent
annexation of Crimea. By acknowledging the referendum in the face
of overwhelming opposition from most nations of the world and
then voting to absorb Crimea, Russia violated its obligations under
the U.N. Charter, its treaties with Ukraine, and the
Budapest Memorandum.
V. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S ACQUISITION UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
In analyzing Russia’s domestic law,
noted. According to the Russian
recognized [principles and] norms
international treaties . . . of the Russian

one initial point should be
Constitution, “[generally]
of international law and
Federation [are an integral]

229. Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/02/222750.htm.
230. Balouziyeh, supra note 178.
231. Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Accusations of
Russia’s Violation of Its Obligations Under the Budapest Memorandum of 5 December 1994,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS RUSS. FED’N (Apr. 1, 2014), http://mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/
arh/b173cc77483edeb944257caf004e64c1?open.
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part of its legal system.” 232 In the event of a conflict between
international treaties and Russian domestic law, the international
treaties govern. 233 Thus, the prior section on Russia’s international
treaty obligations applies equally to its obligations under
domestic law.
A. Russian Federal Constitutional Law
The admission of new territory into the Russian Federation is
governed by the Russian Constitution, article 65. 234 Article 65(1)
lists the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and is altered
as necessary through a method prescribed by federal constitutional
laws. 235 Article 65(2) notes that “admission to the Russian
Federation and the creation in it of a new subject shall be carried out
according to the rules established by the federal constitutional
law.” 236 In accordance with this constitutional provision, a federal
constitutional law was passed in 2001 to prescribe the method for
admitting new territory into Russia. 237 The law establishes the
procedure by which foreign states or parts of foreign states can unite
with the Russian Federation. 238 Any admission of a new subject must
take place in accordance with the Russian Constitution, international
treaties, and federal constitutional law. 239 One of the foundational
principles of acceptance into the Russian Federation is free will. 240 In
order for a foreign state or a part of a foreign state to join the Russian
Federation, there must be mutual agreement or a treaty between the

232. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15(4)
(Russ.) (translation by author).
233. Id.
234. Id. art. 65.
235. Id.
236. Id. art. 65(2) (translation by author).
237. Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o poriadke priniatiia v Rossiiskuiu
Federatsiiu i obrazovaniia v ee sostave novogo sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal
Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the Method of Acceptance into the Russian
Federation and the Formation of a New Subject in the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2001, No. 52, Item 4916 [hereinafter Method of Acceptance].
238. Id. art. 1(1).
239. Id. art. 2(1).
240. Id. art. 3(1).
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Russian Federation and the foreign state. 241 Thus, by the terms of the
federal constitutional law of 2001, a subdivision or part of a foreign
nation cannot be admitted to Russia without the consent of the
foreign nation—the consent of the subdivision is irrelevant.242
Furthermore, the initiator of any offer must be the foreign
government, not Russia or subdivisions of the foreign government. 243
This law was amended in 2005 to clarify that any proposals for
admittance into the Russian Federation must come from both the
legislative, or representative, body and the highest executive body of
the potential subjects 244 and that the request must contain the
241. Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added).
242. In the weeks leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russian legislators were
presented with a problem. As mentioned above, Ukraine would need to initiate any
conversations about ceding Crimea to Russia, which clearly would not happen. To overcome
this problem, Sergei Mironov, along with other legislators, proposed a federal constitutional
law amending the procedure for admission to the Russian Federation, particularly article four.
Draft Federal Constitutional Law On Amending the Federal Constitutional Law on the
Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New Subject of the
Russian Federation in its Composition of the Russian Federation, European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No. 763/2014 at 1 (Mar. 10,
2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2014)011-e.
Instead of requiring the acquiescence of the foreign government, an additional point would be
added which would allow the admission of a portion of a state with the agreement of the
portion “when it is not possible to conclude an international treaty because of the absence of
efficient sovereign state government in the foreign state,” id., and the sub-unit of the foreign
state would be allowed to initiate proposals for admittance to the Russian Federation. Id. at 2.
In explaining its rationale for proposing the modifications, Russia stressed its responsibility to
prevent acts of violence in Ukraine, its long historical ties with Ukraine, the illegitimacy of the
Maidan uprising, and the fact that the proposed draft was in accordance with both the Russian
Constitution and universally recognized principles of international law. Id. at 3–4. The issue
soon became moot because, as discussed above, Crimea declared its independence from
Ukraine following the referendum. Supra Part I. The creators of the draft law requested its
withdrawal following the referendum and the draft law was removed a few days later. Whether
Draft Federal Constitutional Law No. 462741-6 on Amending the Federal Constitutional Law
of the Russian Federation on the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and
Creation of a New Subject Within the Russian Federation Is Compatible with International
Law, Opinion, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion No. 763/2014 at 12 (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)004-e.
243. Method of Acceptance art. 6(1).
244. Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF o vnecenii izmenenii v stat’i 10 i 11
Federal’nogo konstitutsionnogo zakona “O poriadke priniatiia v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu i
obrazovaniia v ee sostave novogo sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Federal Constitutional Law
of the Russian Federation on Introduction of Amendments to Articles 10 and 11 of Federal
Constitutional Law “On the Method of Acceptance into the Russian Federation and the
Formation of a New Subject in the Russian Federation”] art. 1(1), SOBRANIE
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agreed-upon wording for the question that will be put to a
referendum to the potential subjects of the Russian Federation. 245
Furthermore, the amendment made a variety of clarifications to the
process for having a referendum in the interested region, specifically
requiring a consultation with the president of Russia and affirming
that the initiative regarding the referendum belongs to the leaders of
the executive body of the potential subjects, the executive and
legislative leaders are allowed to participate in efforts in support of
the referendum but cannot use the advantages of their positions, and
if in some of the potential areas the referendum is held invalid, the
referendum could be repeated within the next forty-five days. 246 After
the international agreements have been signed, the President of
Russia seeks a determination from the Constitutional Court that the
agreement satisfies the Russian Constitution. 247 If the Court finds the
agreement satisfactory, the Duma is presented with the agreement
for ratification and passes a federal constitutional law accepting the
new area into the Russian Federation. 248 Both a federal law ratifying
the agreement and the federal constitutional law must be passed in
both houses of the legislature 249 and Article 65(1) of the Russian
Constitution must be modified to include the admitted areas. 250
B. Analysis of Russia’s Actions in the Context of Its Domestic Law
Seemingly, Russia followed its domestic process in admitting
Crimea and Sevastopol. Crimea held a referendum regarding
whether it should join Russia and declared its independence after
which President Putin recognized Crimea as an “independent and
sovereign country.” 251 With Crimea ostensibly its own legal nation,
Russia was free to negotiate with it regarding its admission into the
Russian Federation in accordance with domestic law without
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation] 2005, No. 45, Item 4581 (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 10(2)).
245. Id. (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 10(2)(d)).
246. Id. art. 1(2) (modifying Method of Acceptance art. 11(1) and adding Method of
Acceptance art. 11(1-1), 11(1-2), and 11(1-3)).
247. Method of Acceptance art. 7(4).
248. Id. art. 8(1)–8(2).
249. Id. art. 9(1)–9(2).
250. Id. art. 9(4).
251. Heintz, supra note 17.
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engaging in any talks with Ukraine. On March 18, leaders from
Crimea and Sevastopol met with President Putin in Moscow and
signed a treaty 252 that, together with another federal constitutional
law passed by the legislature, brought the two areas into the Russian
Federation. 253 The Constitutional Court determined that the
agreement between the Russian Federation and Crimea satisfied the
requirements of the Russian Constitution. 254 The Court does not, in
its own words, “evaluate the political expediency of entering into an
international treaty.” 255 In performing its review, the Court examined
the various provisions of the treaty and compared them to the
requirements of the Russian Constitution. 256 While the Court did
examine the enactment of the treaty on the Russian side, it did not
examine the legal authority of the Crimean political body to enter
into a treaty nor the legality of the referendum held in Crimea.257

252. Dogovor mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Krym o priniatii v Rossiiskuiu
Federatsiiu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov
[Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Acceptance of the
Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Formation in the Russian Federation
of New Subjects], Russ.-Rep. Crimea, Mar. 18, 2014, BIULLETEN’ MEZHDUNARODNYKH
DOGOVOROV (Bulletin of International Treaties) 2014, Nо. 6 (Russ.).
253. Federal’nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon RF O priniatii v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu
Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov - Respubliki
Krym i goroda federal’nogo znacheniia Sevastopolia [Federal Constitutional Law of the
Russian Federation on Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and
the Formation in the Russian Federation of New Subjects—the Republic of Crimea and the
Federal City of Sevastopol], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 12, Item 1201.
254. Postanovleniia Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF “Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti
ne vstupivshego v silu mezhdunarodnogo dogovora mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i
Respublikoi Krym o priniatii v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiiu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave
Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub”ektov” [Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation “Verifying the Constitutionality of the Pending International Treaty Between the
Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea
into the Russian Federation and the Creation Within the Russian Federation of New
Subjects”], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 13, Item 1527.
255. Id. (translation by the author).
256. Id.
257. Id. (noting that the treaty was signed by the President of the Russian Federation,
who has power over the basic direction of both internal and external political decisions from
the Russian Constitution, who represents Russia both inside the country and in international
relations as the head of state, and who leads the external politics of the country, particularly
negotiations and international agreements). No such analysis is performed of the authority of
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Thus, all steps in Russia’s domestic process were followed in
admitting Crimea and Sevastopol assuming, as the court did, that the
referendum in Crimea was valid.
There were, however, a few problems with the process Russia
used. As noted above, admitting new subjects must be accomplished
in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation.
The ways that Russia has violated its treaty obligations, both with
Ukraine and as a member of the United Nations, have already been
addressed. 258 Because the treaties are also an explicit part of its
method of acquiring new subjects, Russia did not follow the
domestic requirements, even if it did follow the overall procedure set
out in its constitutional law. In addition, the referendum, which is
required under the federal constitutional law, must be valid. Russian
law does not seem to clarify who determines the validity of a
referendum seeking to alter international borders. However, because
of the international ramifications of such an act, widespread
international acceptance seems to be an appropriate standard. While
Russia acknowledged the validity of the referendum, international
bodies including the U.N. and the E.U. did not recognize it. 259
Because the referendum was not valid, Russian law requires that a
second referendum be held within forty-five days of the referendum
that was deemed invalid. Finally, if the allegations made by Novaya
Gazeta are true regarding Russia’s intentions to enter Crimea and
agitate the population into seeking to join the Russian Federation,260
it is possible to consider Russia’s actions to be in violation of the
domestic law as the population of Crimea did not act of its own free
will and did not initiate the negotiations regarding joining Russia,
which is another requirement of Russia’s constitutional law.

the corresponding signers from Crimea and Sevastopol or of the legality of entering into an
agreement with them.
258. See supra Section IV.D.
259. G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 24, at ¶ 4 (noting that the referendum had no
validity and could not be the basis for any change in status of Crimea); Harding & Walker,
supra note 148 (noting that President Obama told President Putin that the referendum
“would never be recognised” and noting that Herman Van Rompuy, president of the
European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, European Commission president, declared that
“the referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be recognised”).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 136–42.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The most crucial aspect in ascertaining whether Russia’s actions
complied with international law is determining the legality of the
Crimean referendum on independence. Crimea’s referendum did not
comply with Ukrainian domestic law and did not comply with
international law, largely due to the significant influence that Russia
wielded in the process and the oddities associated with the
referendum. However, even assuming that the referendum was valid
and that there was no undue influence from Russia during the
polling process, Russia had treaty obligations and a general
obligation under the Budapest Memorandum to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
In addition, Russia’s significant influence on the referendum
process tainted the acquisition even from the point of view of
Russian domestic law. Considering the purported evidence of
Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine prior to the February events that
ousted Yanukovych, it is hard to see much support for Russia’s
assertion that Crimea, not Russia itself, had taken the initiative to
request admittance to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Russia’s
constitutional law requires that the process occur by the free will of
the country that is to join the Russian Federation. 261 The presence of
Russian troops monitoring a vote to decide if Crimea would join
Russia could hardly be described as a process where the citizens were
able to express their own free will.
While Russia’s actions in acquiring Crimea were not in
accordance with law, there was widespread support for the
referendum in Crimea and Sevastopol. 262 Even outside of Crimea,
eastern Ukrainian cities saw demonstrations in support of Crimea
and Russia, with thousands of demonstrators rallying in Donetsk,
Kharkiv, and Odessa. 263 In Crimea, tens of thousands of people
celebrated the preliminary vote totals with fireworks, the Russian
national anthem, and parties in the city squares. 264 Many Crimeans
see Russia as a source of new rights and opportunities—a new system
261. In the Federal Constitutional Law, the Russian word dobrovol’no is used, which
means voluntarily, of one’s own free will, of one’s own accord.
262. Morello, Englund & Witte, supra note 9.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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in which Crimea will be able to develop. 265 In Simferopol, Crimea’s
capital, a concert was held and thousands danced to live music.266
Despite the illegality of Russia’s acts, it is hard to see a peaceful
return of Crimea to Ukraine—for either the ethnic Russians in
Crimea or for the Russian government.
Trevor McDougal*

265. Smith-Spark, Magnay & Walsh, supra note 14. One voter noted that he wanted “to
join Russia, and live like Russians, with all their rights,” another commented that “Russia is an
opportunity for our Crimea to develop, to bloom. And I believe that it will be so.” Id.
266. McPhedran & Arutunyan, supra note 155.
*
J.D. candidate, April 2016, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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